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1Order 888 relates to "stranded costs" and open access to the power grid, while Order 889 addresses
information sharing on transmission capacity via electronic means (see EIA, 1997).  Estimates of the magnitude
of total stranded costs vary from $10 to $500 billion (EIA, 1996, p. 78).
    
2In the past, manufacturers have used the threat of relocation to bargain for lower electric energy rates from
local utilities (EIA, 1996, p. 36, quoting Kuhn, 1996).
    
3In practice, engineering considerations and physical laws of electric energy transmission will make it
economically unfeasible for a generating plant, say in Florida, to supply the West Coast with energy.
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Location Decisions of Energy-Intensive Manufacturing Firms:
Estimating the Potential Impact of Electric Utilities Deregulation
1.  Introduction
The recent deregulation of electric utilities has generated considerable discussion, particularly
in the popular media (e.g., Selz, 1996; Fialka, 1996; Holden 1997), but also among economic
developers (Whitehead, 1997).  Built on the premise of reduced electric energy costs that result from
increased competition, deregulation under Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Orders
888 and 889 of April 24, 1996, promises to increase aggregate consumer welfare both through
reduced residential energy expenditures and through lower prices of goods as manufacturers pass
savings on electricity bills on to their customers.
1  In addition to these immediate effects, deregulation
has the potential to alter the spatial distribution of manufacturing activity, creating winning and losing
communities in the process.
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Under a deregulated electricity generation, transmission and (retail) distribution (GTD)
system, firms can purchase electricity from the lowest-cost supplier, who in principle may reside
anywhere in the nation.  Owners of manufacturing firms who previously sought out regions because
of their low electricity rates are no longer bound to such regions because, at least theoretically, the
entire nation now comprises the service area of a given electricity supplier, and rates are expected to
converge over time nationally to the same level.
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Regions which previously enjoyed a comparative advantage in recruiting manufacturing
industries by offering low electricity rates no longer have such an advantage, and may not only attract
fewer firms under deregulation, but may even lose firms to other regions of the country.  For
example, the northwestern states of Washington, Oregon, Montana and Idaho had among the lowest
electricity rates in the nation in 1995, averaging 4.38¢ per kWh, well below the national average of
6.89¢ (EIA, 1997).  If rates decline in formerly high-cost regions!such as New England!in a
competitive national market, firms may leave the northwest for the northeast if the latter region offers
greater abundance of other inputs.  More specifically, profit-maximizing footloose firms which were
once attracted into an area by low electric rates have incentives under deregulation to seek locations
at which other scare factors of production are more abundant, or where proximity to customers
reduces transportation costs.
This paper examines the location decisions of a certain class of manufacturing firms ! those
that use a relatively large share of electric energy among their intermediate inputs ! and identifies
factors systematically associated with new establishment locations in recent years.  A key question
is whether electric energy-intensive firms will relocate to take advantage of lower electricity rates,
creating a "sucking sound" of firm relocations (Holden, p. B6):
Utility executives agree that if neighboring states have essentially the same mix of
environmental restrictions, taxes and regulation, they will likely have similar electric rates.
If that mix is changed to bring savings of, say, 20% due to regulation, businesses thinking of
relocating will quickly start to favor the state with the cheaper power.  Industries for which
electricity is a major expense, such as aluminum smelting and grocery retailing, are
particularly sensitive to power price swings.
In a similar vein, Whitehead (p. 58) maintains that:
As site selection projects become more capital intensive, electric power issues have taken on
increased importance, in terms of power cost and availability as well as reliability of service.
In the past, electric power costs typically amounted to only 3-4 percent of geographicallyPage 3
variable costs.  Today, as companies increasingly seek productivity improvements by
replacing workers with power-intensive machinery and equipment, it is not unusual to have
electric power consumption represent 5-10 percent of the geographically variable costs.
These quotes suggest that an analysis of location decisions of firms using electric energy intensively
may provide useful indications about the effect of deregulation on industrial restructuring.  In
particular, it may provide early warnings to communities facing the loss of such firms, and also
suggest which communities may gain economic activity in a deregulated environment.
2.  Modeling Firm Locations Decisions
While a rich literature exists on manufacturing firm locations decisions in the U.S. (e.g., Blair
and Premus; Herzog and Schlottmann; Goetz; Fox and Murray; Bartik; Calzonetti and Walker), no
study focuses specifically on the location decisions of manufacturers who rely heavily on electric
energy in their production processes.  Consequently, no previous work can be consulted to help guide
the specification of the estimating equations, and instead general firm location principles are used here
based on theoretical considerations.  Both the specific manner in which the dependent variable is
defined and measured, and the regressors to be included in the econometric equations are discussed
in detail.
2.1.  Modeling the Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in this study is the county-level net change in the number of energy-
intensive establishments between 1988 and 1994.  This time frame is dictated by four considerations:
First, at the time this study was initiated, 1994 was the most recent year for which sufficiently detailed
county-level data were available.  Second, to better represent emerging industries, modifications were
made to the Standard Industrial Code between 1987 and 1988, leading to a discontinuity in the timePage 4
series data for certain industries over that two-year period.  Third, Bartik (1991) maintains that
between one and six years is an appropriate period over which equilibrium is restored in an economy
in response to an initial shock.  Fourth, the choice of 1988 as the starting year over which growth is
examined corresponds well with data availability, including the 1990 Census of Population and the
1987 Census of Manufacturers.
The specific four-digit SIC energy-intensive industries were selected in a two-step procedure.
First, the top two-digit major industry groups in terms of energy-intensity ratios were selected from
Table 2 (p. 10) in Energy Information Administration (1995); Gellings (1994) contains related data.
Energy-intensity ratios are calculated as thousands of BTUs of energy used per dollar of value of
shipments in 1991, with electric energy converted using the generating plant's BTU-equivalent.  The
five SIC industries groups are, with the energy-intensity ratio reported in parentheses:  S26 Paper and
Allied Products (26.01%); S28 Chemicals and Allied Products (16.99); S29 Petroleum and Coal
Products (23.43); S32 Stone, Clay and Glass Products (21.90); and S33 Primary Metal Industries
(28.37).
In the second step, the national input requirements matrix from IMPLAN (MIG, Inc., 1995)
was used to calculate, for each sector in the five two-digit industry grouping identified above, the
share of electricity consumption as a percent of all intermediate inputs.  This required matching the
IMPLAN-specific sectors with Department of Commerce SIC codes.  Any industry consuming more
than 5% of its intermediate inputs in the form of electricity is defined as energy-intensive for the
purposes of this study.  This criterion leads to selection of 31 four-digit sectors.  Since the number
of counties with net gains and losses is relatively small at the 3- and 4-digit SIC levels, industries were
aggregated at the two-digit level for the subsequent analysis, leaving S26, S28, S32 and S33.Page 5
2.2.  The Explanatory Variables
In theory, firms choose locations to maximize profits, which in turn depend on spatially-
varying product and input prices, as well as transportation charges:
(1) Bi = piyi ! vixi ! Ji
where Bi denotes profits in the ith county, pi is the price of a composite output produced, yi denotes
the quantity of the output produced; vi is a vector of input prices corresponding to inputs, xi; and Ji
is aggregate transportation costs (of both inputs and outputs) incurred by the firm when locating in
county i.
For manufacturing firms, profit-maximization usually involves trading off a location close to
input suppliers with a location close to consumers of the final product.  Depending on the nature of
the output produced, firms may locate close to their customers (these are market-oriented firms);
close to input suppliers (input-oriented firms) or somewhere in between (Capps et al., 1988).  The
latter type of firm is considered to be footloose since only a small change in relative input/output
prices or transportation charges can induce it to locate elsewhere.
Recent location studies suggest four different categories of variables which need to be
considered in modeling firm location decisions (e.g., Goetz, 1997; Glasmeier, 1991).  These are (1)
market access variables; (2) labor force variables; (3) policy variables; and (4) agglomeration factors.
In county-level studies, market access can be measured using availability of highways, railroads or
sea ports, and also by household income (or its inverse, the poverty level) as a proxy for consumers'
purchasing power.  Labor force factors typically include training and skills of workers, average
wages, unionization and unemployment rates as well as basic population demographics including race,     
4A similar argument has been made in the context of unionization.
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age and sex (e.g., Partridge, 1994).  The cost of electric energy is also included here as a major factor
in the location decision of these electric energy-intensive firms.
Policy variables generally include local government revenues and expenditures.  As Partridge
explains, it is necessary to include both categories to allow for appropriate controls; high levels of
government expenditure imply a large supply of public services which, in principle, makes a
community more attractive.  However, to accurately gauge the value of those services, it is also
necessary to consider the cost of providing them, which is accomplished by including local tax levels
as a control variable.
Other variables included in this category are state-level measures of corporate tax rates,
industrial recruitment incentives offered, and environmental policies.  Since certain energy-intensive
firms are also heavy polluters, a state's environmental policies are especially important in this kind of
study.  On the one hand, pro-environmental policies should deter locations by raising costs of
manufacturing.  On the other, states that already have stricter environmental policies may be less
likely to enact even tougher policies in the future, so that less uncertainty surrounds the decision to
locate in those types of states.
4
The last category of variables, agglomeration economies, measures the effect of cost-savings
or extra costs that arise by locating in close proximity to existing firms in the same industry.
Additional agglomeration measures included here are population size of the county, and population
density to proxy for land costs (along with median housing values).  In this study, measures of rurality
and adjacency of non-metro counties to metropolitan areas are also included to capture effects of
disagglomeration economies.Page 7
In addition to a larger model (see appendix table A for regressors), an auxiliary "short" model
is estimated, which contains only a minimum of explanatory variables.  This model represents a test
of the above quote from Holden (1997), and contains only seven regressors: the price of energy;
environmental policies; state and local revenues and expenditures; the poverty rate; population size;
and the number of existing establishments in the industry modeled.
2.3.  Statistical Estimation Strategies
Some counties experienced a net loss of high-tech establishments, others had a net gain, and
many experienced no net change between 1988 and 1994.  A straightforward way of modeling these
events is to use the net change in the number of firms as the dependent variable (Snnchg, where
nn=26, 28, 32 or 33), which ranges from !  to + , and estimate this equation using Ordinary ¥ ¥
Least Squares (OLS).  This means, however, that the same equation is forced to explain both net
gains in establishments as well as net losses, which is a stringent requirement.  More specifically, there
is no a priori reason to believe that the forces determining new firm locations are necessarily the same
as those explaining firm losses.  The latter may depend more on the national business cycle and global
conditions than characteristics of the local economy (see also the related discussion in Partridge).
The primary statistical estimation procedures employed in this study are the probit and Tobit maxi-
mum likelihood methods.
The Tobit estimator forces a given regressor to determine both the probability that the non-
censored event is realized (i.e., that establishment growth occurs), and the amount of that event (the
number of net new establishments).  By estimating the probit and Tobit models using the same data
set additional insights into firm locations may be obtained which would not be realized if only the
Tobit model is estimated (see, e.g., Goetz and Morgan, 1995; Goetz and Debertin, 1996; and GoetzPage 8
and Kemlage, 1996).  These issues are discussed at greater length in the unabbreviated version of this
paper, which is available from the author.
3.  Estimation Results
3.1.  Short Model
OLS and Tobit estimation results for the "short" model are presented in table 1.  The state-
level price of electric energy, according to the Tobit estimates, significantly influenced firm location
decisions between 1988 and 1994 for the industry groups studied, with the exception only of the S26
group.  Thus, higher energy costs jointly reduced both the likelihood of net establishment growth and
the net number of establishments locating in a county.  This result holds after controlling for
environmental policies which, surprisingly, had an effect opposite to that expected: states with stricter
policies were more likely to attract energy-intensive establishments.  A plausible interpretation, as
suggested earlier, is that firms prefer to locate in states (and counties) which have enacted stricter
policies, since that reduces firms' risk of facing tighter and more costly regulations in the future.  At
least for S33, local government tax and expenditure policies have predicted effects on firm locations.
3.2.  Full Model
To explore further the effects of other variables traditionally considered in location decisions
on net changes in energy-intensive firm locations, the longer models described above were estimated.
Due to space limitations, detailed results are reported below only for S32 (table 2); results for the
other industry groups are available from the author.  Electric energy-intensive manufacturing
establishments respond in a statistically significant manner to availability of infrastructure (although
to varying degrees), labor force demographics, state and local tax and spending policies, andPage 9
especially to the degree of rurality, population density, population size and existing firm numbers.
In contrast, firms do not respond to state-level incentives and, most noteworthy, to energy prices,
after all of the other variables identified in table 2 are held constant.  Even so, the coefficient estimates
for the price of energy are negative as expected.  A plausible reason for this is that the energy price
is measured at the state-level and therefore does not exhibit enough variation in comparison with the
other regressors, for which county-level data are available.  Thus, it would not be prudent to conclude
from this analysis that energy prices do not matter, particularly in view of the findings reported for
the "short" model in table 1.
More specifically, this study suggests that if energy prices converge nationally to the same
level under deregulation, counties with the following characteristics may have greater odds of
attracting firms in the S32!Stone, Clay and Glass Products industry: Counties with interstate highway
access; lower shares of elderly, young, males, unionized, rural and metro-non-adjacent populations;
higher unemployment rates; lower total revenues but higher general debt as a share of income; less
strict environmental policies; higher median housing values; lower population densities but larger total
populations; and fewer existing S32 establishments.
4.  Summary and Conclusion
Rural areas, and areas not adjacent to metro areas appear to be especially vulnerable to losing
electric energy-intensive manufacturing firms!or not gaining new ones!in a deregulated environment
if they are unable to compete on the basis of low-cost energy, all else equal.  Thus, if rural areas once
had an advantage in attracting these types of firms by offering inexpensive power, that advantage is
now lost.  Basic labor force demographics, especially the share of young and elderly in the population,Page 10
exert a strong influence on the location decisions of these firms.  More immediate policy levers
available to state and local governments to influence location decisions include the balance between
taxes raised and public expenditures, and the prevalence of basic transportation infrastructure.
Table 1: OLS and Tobit Results for Energy-Intensive Firm Locations, "Short" Model
)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
S26chg S28chg S32chg S33chg
Variable OLS OLS Tobit OLS Tobit OLS Tobit
))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
Constant 0.077 0.420*** 0.443 0.514* 2.296** 0.422** 1.519*
(1.51) (2.86) (0.51) (2.11) (2.79) (2.78) (1.64)
PEnergy 0.004 !0.038† !0.430* !0.013 !0.336* !0.054* !0.645**
(0.40) (1.31) (2.52) (0.27) (2.11) (1.80) (3.57)
GRNPOL !0.188* !0.329 !3.142* !0.235 !5.695** !0.011 !3.144*
  *10,000 (1.91) (1.17) (1.94) (0.50) (3.68) (0.04) (1.83)
TOTREVPY !0.026 0.989 2.536 !0.834 !10.38* !0.703 !14.25**
(0.11) (1.44) (0.58) (0.73) (2.35) (0.99) (2.92)
GENEXPPY !0.094 !1.316* !4.938 !0.022 !0.318 0.316 7.460†
(0.36) (1.75) (1.00) (0.02) (0.07) (0.41) (1.60)
POVRATE !0.066 !0.471* !8.228** !1.049** !8.652** !0.572** !7.857**
(0.95) (2.36) (5.79) (3.17) (6.49) (2.76) (5.18)
POP88 !0.136** !0.089 1.267** 1.468** 2.982** 0.369** 2.300**









F 2.606** 2.862** 2.528**
(21.08) (28.69) (18.85)
))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
Statistical significance levels: *=10%, **=1% or lower; †=10% or lower in a two-tailed test. Asymptotic t-statistics
are shown in parentheses. A singular Hessian was obtained for S26 during Newton iterations for the Tobit model.Page 11
Table 2: Location Model Results for S32 Firms (Stone, Clay and Glass Products)
))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
Growth Growth Decline
Variable OLS t-stat Tobit t-stat Probit t-stat Probit t-stat
))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
Constant 0.562 0.72 10.71** 2.91 4.254** 3.00 4.148** 2.68
HWY_DUM 0.035 0.83 0.243† 1.44 0.083 1.26 0.129* 1.77
RAIL_DUM !0.083* 1.88 !0.165 0.86 !0.062 0.82 0.226* 2.48
PORTS !0.139 0.50 !0.024 0.07 !0.011 0.08 0.141 0.96
OLDER 0.191 0.21 !8.552** 2.88 !3.878** 3.33 !3.870** 2.89
UNDER18 !0.693 0.71 !10.12** 2.95 !3.775** 2.81 !2.782* 1.83
WHITEPER 0.435* 2.14 2.251** 2.80 0.797** 2.60 !0.071 0.21
MALEPER !0.863 0.80 !18.20** 2.75 !7.308** 2.88 !5.336* 1.99
COLLGRAD 1.443* 1.73 1.195 0.68 !0.180 0.26 !0.928 1.18
HSONLY 0.174 0.34 1.925 1.05 0.668 0.94 !0.899 1.15
POVRATE 0.005 0.01 !1.962 0.90 !0.614 0.73 !1.731* 1.80
UNEMRATE 1.683** 2.62 9.674** 2.82 3.215* 2.44 !1.250 0.79
ERNPROD2 0.006 0.49 0.037 0.87 0.020 1.22 0.021 1.15
UNION88 !0.682* 2.03 !1.789* 2.32 !0.419† 1.37 0.477† 1.42
TOTREVPY !0.691 0.77 !9.441* 2.17 !3.958* 2.21 !1.520 0.79
GENEXPPY !0.432 0.43 1.005 0.23 0.748 0.41 1.857 0.94
GENDEBPY 0.123* 1.76 0.867* 2.04 0.308* 1.82 0.069 0.37
CORPMART !0.005 0.50 0.028 1.00 0.011 0.94 0.010 0.79
INCEN2 0.005 0.52 !0.023 0.72 !0.011 0.84 !0.001 0.09
GRNPOL !7.74e-05 1.22 !4.96e-04** 2.63 !1.56e-04* 2.10 !1.30e-04 1.56
PEnergy !0.013 0.26 !0.204 1.19 !0.071 1.06 !0.066 0.86
PERRURAL !0.208† 1.45 !2.052** 5.49 !0.715** 4.94 !0.623** 3.82
NONADJ !0.113** 3.00 !0.609** 3.21 !0.195** 2.68 !0.110 1.34
MEDVAL 7.08e-07 0.36 5.97e-06* 1.83 3.70e-06** 2.67 !1.13e-06 0.73
POPDEN !1.64e-04** 3.79 !2.78e-04** 2.66 !1.26e-04** 2.77 1.19e-04** 3.00
POP88 1.93e-06* 2.15 2.09e-06** 3.33 7.95e-07** 2.93 !2.17e-06** 7.56
S32 !0.113** 2.98 !0.044* 1.70 !0.029** 2.60 0.113** 9.44
F 2.685** 29.02
))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
Statistical significance levels: *=10%, **=1% or lower; †=10% or lower in a two-tailed test.Page 12
Appendix Table A: Description of Regressors, Summary Statistics and Data Sources
))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
Variable Description Mean Stdev. Source
))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
Market Access Variables
 HWY_DUM Interstate Highway access (+) 0.427 0.495 DoT
i
 RAIL_DUM Railroad indicator variable (+) 0.764 0.425 DoT
 PORTS Seaport access indicator variable (+) 0.039 0.195 DoT
Labor Force Variables
 OLDER Population older than 65 years, 1990 (% of total) (!) 0.150 0.043 CoP
a
 UNDER18 Population 17 years and younger, 1990 (%) (!) 0.269 0.034 CoP
 WHITEPER Population that is white, 1990 (%) (±) 0.876 0.152 CoP
 MALEPER Population that is male, 1990 (%) (±) 0.490 0.016 CoP
 COLLGRAD College graduates, 1990 (% of popl. 25 years or older) (+) 0.134 0.064 CoP
 HSONLY High school grads., 1990 (% of popl. 25 yrs. or older) (+) 0.562 0.075 CoP
 POVRATE Poverty rate, 1990 (%) (!) 0.168 0.079 CoP
 UNEMRATE Unemployment rate, 1988 (%) (+) 0.068 0.033 USA CD
b
 ERNPROD2 Manufacturing wage, 1987 ($ per hour) (!) 8.503 2.146 CoM
c
 UNION88 Unionization, 1988 (% of manuf. workers, state-level) (!) 0.197 0.122 USA CD
Policy Variables
 TOTREVPY Total government revenue, 1987 (per dollar of income) (!) 0.117 0.052 CoGd
 GENEXPPY General govt. expenditure, 1987 (per dollar of income) (+) 0.114 0.048 CoG
 GENDEBPY General govt. debt, 1987 (per dollar of income) (+) 0.079 0.219 CoG
 CORPMART Marginal corporate tax rate (on $ million) (!) 5.878 3.026 SDoD
e
 INCEN2 Industrial recruitment incentives (number) (+) 9.094 2.691 SSM
f
 GRNPOL Environmental policies index (state-level, 1986-88) (+) 2287.5 597.3 H&K
h
Other
 PEnergy Energy prices (cents per kiloWatt hour); state-level (!) 3.615 0.528 EIA
g
Agglomeration Factors
 PERRURAL Rural residents (% of population) (!) 0.641 0.293 CoP
 NONADJ Non-adjacent nonmetro county (!) 0.416 0.493 USDA
j
 MEDVAL Median housing value ($) (!) 53191 32656 CoP
 POPDEN Population density, 1988 (residents per square mile) (!) 194.6 1418.0 CoP
 POP88 Population, 1988 (number) (+) 78410 262220 CoP
 S26 SIC 26 (energy-intensive) establishments, 1988 (number) (±) 0.183 0.708 CBP
k
 S28 SIC 28 (energy-intensive) establishments, 1988 (number) (±) 0.776 3.162 CBP
 S32 SIC 32 (energy-intensive) establishments, 1988 (number) (±) 1.528 6.014 CBP
 S33 SIC 33 (energy-intensive) establishments, 1988 (number) (±) 0.995 4.698 CBP
))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
a. Census of Population, 1990; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Washington, D.C.
b. USA Counties on CD, CD-ROM, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Washington, D.C.
c. Census of Manufacturers, 1987; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Washington, D.C.
d. Census of Government, 1987; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Washington, D.C.
e. U.S. Data on Demand, Inc., State Data on Demand, Guide, First Edition, McConnellsburg, PA., 1990.
f. Site Selection Magazine, October Issue, 1987.
g. Energy Information Administration, Washington, D.C.
h. Hall, B. and M.L. Kerr, 1991-1992 Green Index: A State-by-State Guide to the Nation's Environmental Health, Washington,
D.C., Island Press, 1991.
i. Department of Transportation, Transportation Data Sampler CD-Rom, Washington, D.C., 1987.
j. USDA Beale Code.  Ross Cook, P., "1989 ERS County Typology Codes," January, 1995; available at:
usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/data-sets/rural/86005/3/typol89.wk1
k. County Business Patterns, CD-Rom, U.S. Department of Commerce, various years (1988-89 and 1993-94).Page 13
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